Weimar Culture and the Rise of National Socialism: The Kampfbund fiir deutsche Kultur Alan E. Steinweis B ETWEEN 1928 and 1932, the National Socialist movement transformed itself from an insurgent fringe party into Germany's most potent political force. The most important factor in this dramatic turnabout in political fortunes was the rapid deterioration of the German economy beginning in 1929. It does not, however, logically follow that the German people simply fell into the lap of the party and its charismatic leader. To the contrary, the party aggressively employed sophisticated propagandistic and organizational strategies for attracting and mobilizing diverse segments of German society. With the onset of the economic crisis, and the consequent social and political turmoil, the party stood ready to receive, organize, and mobilize Germans from all social strata. ' Cultural issues featured prominently in propaganda, particularly in the latter, decisive phase of the Nazis' rise to power. After its breakthrough in the September 1930 Reichstag elections, the NSDAP wasted little time before going on a cultural offensive. In December 1930, for example, provocations in Berlin achieved a major symbolic victory, compelling the government to ban the film version of Remarque's All Quiet on the Western Front.' Despite such successes, the movement's reliance on artis-FO; their comments on earlier drafts of this paper, the author would like to thank Geoffrey Giles, Wolfgang Natter, William S. Allen, and the participants in the facultygraduate student colloquium of the Department of History, Florida State University. tic and cultural strategies during its rise to power has not been subjected to rigorous analysis. Although several studies have examined the cultural policies implemented by the Nazis once in power, the historiography is deficient when it comes to the role of cultural politics in pre-1933 mobilization strategies. Ironically, the use of art and culture as a political weapon by the left-wing parties has generated far more scholarly i n t e r e~t .~ At the tinie of the seizure of power, the Kampfbundflr deutsche Kultur functioned as the movement's primary vehicle for cultural and artistic mobilization. Yet little is known about this organization. Although the Kampfbund forms the focus of a chapter in Reinhard Bollmus's authoritative study of Alfred Rosenberg's career in the movement, Bollmus concentrates primarily on the role of the Kampfbund in the Byzantine jurisdictional conflicts of the Third R e i~h .~ In contrast, Bollmus says relatively little about the Kampfbund's contribution to the growth and popularity of the movement before 1933. Several recent turns in the historiography of the Weimar Republic and pre-1933 National Socialism would now make a fresh look at the Kampfbund particularly worthwhile. There has been a renewal of interest in the importance of broad cultural, as opposed to strictly socioeconomic, factors in the weakening of Weimar democracy and the success of N a z i~m .~ Also increasingly prevalent have been studies investigating the social, rather than the purely political, mechanisms through which the volkische worldview was disseminated among the German p~p u l a t i o n .~ The Kampfbund constitutes
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WEIMAR CULTURE AND NATIONAL SOCIALlSM an excellent case study of how artistic and cultural activism shaped the Nazi movement's public image during the later stages of the "time of struggle," helping to pave the party's path to social respectability among the propertied and educated middle class (Besitz und Bildungsburgertum).
The origins of the KampJbund must be understood in two broader contexts: that of the cultural politics of the Weimar Republic, and that of the mobilization strategies employed by the National Socialist movement.' Conflict between tradition and experimentation on the artistic scene reflected the profound social and ideological cleavages of Weimar Germany. The efflorescence of artistic modernism after World War I had coincided with a profound shake-up of the social relationships and economic structures that had prevailed before the war. Thus, to many Germans, artistic modernism exacerbated a more fundamental disorientation. Believing the proper function of art to be a lifting of the spirit through an emphasis on beauty and heroism, the critics of modernism condemned forms of art conceived as means for exploring new perspectives on reality and for bringing society's blemishes into sharper focus. They believed that Germany had lost its traditional bearings, and that the new art functioned as a critical and corrosive force, promoting the unraveling of the social fabric by questioning the legitimacy of prevailing attitudes and institutions. Cultural anxiety manifested itself in many forms and across a wide political spectrum.' O n the extreme Right, it often assumed the form of conspiracy theory: the threat to traditional German culture was said to emanate from a network of racially, spiritually, and even financially interconnected artistic and cultural movements, led by Jews and Marxists, promoted by feminists, and most conspicuously symbolized by the increasing visibility of "Negroes" on the art scene.
Among Germans professionally involved in the arts, modernism could represent more than an affront to prevailing sensibilities. It could also pose a personal threat to artists who understood themselves to be the guardians of tradition, a role in which many took a good deal of pride, and for which several received handsome financial compensation. Para-doxically, the financially unsuccessful could conveniently blame their professional misfortunes on the new trends. The new art, they argued, dismissed the relevance of the taste and skills that they had been taught to cultivate, substituting instead an excessive emphasis on intellectual abstractions and political content. Furthermore, they contended, the new art had scared many average Germans away from galleries, theaters, and concert halls. German artists faced starvation, they argued, because German art had been uprooted from its nurturing soil, the p e~p l e .~ By 1932, the pool of unemployed artists in which such notions could take hold was enormous.1°
The Kampfbund set forth as one of its paramount goals the need to educate Germans about the intimate connection between cultural decay and national decline. As the inaugural issue of the Kampfbund's newsletter explained, the "political and economic collapse of Germany" after the Great War had been "more than a merely external event." Rather, "it was only the metaphor for an inner lack of belief in the value of Germandom." Similarly, the chaos of Weimar politics merely signified a more fundamental malaise rooted in the "absence of a universally popular state and cultural ideal." The Kampfbund's founders conceived its mission as one of volkisch consciousness-raising. It was to "defend the value of the German essence" in the "midst of present-day cultural decadence" by promoting every "authentic [arteigene] expression of German cultural life." It would "enlighten" the German people about the "connections between race, art, and science." Through lectures and publications, it would promote the work and thought of "important" Germans who had been "silenced" by the forces of decay."
Hitler and other Nazi leaders had scathingly denounced cultural "degeneracy" in speeches and writings since the early 1920s. The fact, then, that the party's systematic effort to instrumentalize cultural anxiety came only in 1928 requires some explanation. Since its refounding in 1925, the party's attempt to attract members from all classes of German society 
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had met with mixed results. Whereas NSDAP recruitment efforts among the working class had yielded disappointing results, appeals to the middle and upper-middle classes had been more successful. The party leadership resolved, therefore, to concentrate its proselytizing on the various layers of the German bourgeoisie. Germans of the educated and propertied middle class presented a special recruitment challenge. Although not numerous in absolute terms, their adherence would lend respectability to a plebeian movement whose public image derived largely from its lowermiddle-class base and its brown-shirted paramilitary auxiliary. The plebeian stigma had not necessarily had the effect of keeping elites out of the party; to the contrary, several categories of German elites had already demonstrated a higher-than-average proclivity for joining the party. Nonetheless, party leaders sensed that many members of the educated and cultural elite continued to shy away from participation in the movement, despite being quietly or potentially sympathetic.12
The founding of the Kampfbundfir deutsche Kultur must therefore be viewed as part of the same NSDAP organizational reform of 1928-29 that produced new party auxiliaries for university students, teachers, physicians, and lawyers.13 The specific circumstances of the Kampfbund's birth in 1928, however, remain somewhat obscure due to a paucity of documents. Bollmus attributes the main initiative to Alfred Rosenberg, editor of the Volkischer Beobachter, the NSDAP organ, and the party s unofficial chief spokesman on cultural matters. However, Hans Hinkel, founder and leader of the Kampfbund's Berlin chapter, claimed in a postwar statement that Hugo Bruckmann, the Munich right-wing publisher, had been the main force in founding the Kampfbund, and that Rosenberg had merely commandeered it a short time later.l4 On the surface, the connection with the party appeared to consist mainly of overlapping personnel. Among the first set of thirteen directors, Franz X. Schwarz, the Nazi party treasurer, Franz Ritter von Epp, a retired general and Nazi Reichstag delegate, and Rosenberg himself were publicly identified with the Nazi movement. The remainder of the board consisted of prominent non-Nazi members of the German far right wing, such as publisher Julius F. Lehmann, mathematician Philipp Lenard, architect Paul Schultze-Naumburg, and Othmar Spann, a lead- ing exponent of corporatist theory.15 These ambiquities pose the question of whether the Kampfbund was at the very outset conceived as an NSDAP front organization, or as an autonomous entity embodying an alliance between National Socialists and other forces of the volkisch Right. In either case, by mid-1929 National Socialist influence in the Kampfbund had become preponderant, even though the connection between the two organizations remained informal.
Given the NSDAP's desire to penetrate the German upper bourgeoisie more effectively, keeping the Kampfbund at arm's length made good strategic sense. Not only would the Kampfbund avoid the plebeian stigma of the NSDAP, it would also exploit a widespread antipathy toward party politics that had infected the German middle and upper-middle classes.16 Thus, even as it sought to use art and culture to politicize Germans, the Kampfbund emphasized a pretense to apoliticism. In an effort to avoid possible party-related problems, its published "Operating Principles" stressed the non-party character of the organization. The "fundamental, universal-national" questions to be addressed by the Kampfbund did not "belong to the competence of political parties."" This official foreswearing of partisanship was reflected in the Kampfbund's official newsletter, in which references to the Nazi party and Adolf Hitler were conspicuously infrequent. The editors treated the NSDAP as a distinctly separate entity.l8
Accordingly, the Kampfbund's founders foresaw not a centralized party-style organization, but rather a network of semi-autonomous local cultural associations, bearing the same label and pursuing similar goals. They assumed, or hoped, that the nature of social and associational life, especially in small communities, would enable relatively tiny cadres of activists to make their mark on political discourse and attitudes. Coordinated by a central office, and with the newsletter providing an "intellectual bond,"19 local activists were encouraged to act on their own initiatives in the planning of public lectures and other functions. Members were also especially encouraged to use word-of-mouth to "personally inform all acquaintances about the idea of the Kampfbund." Envisaging a kind of Nazi salon culture, the Kampfbund leadership hoped that "small groups of adherents" would gather for "monthly conversation evenings" to discuss relevant issues and to "deepen personal familiarity. "*O Although the Kampjbund had announced its existence to the world in May 1928, its real work first began in early 1929. Operating out of a small office in Munich, the organization initiated publication of a newsletter, the Mitteilungen, in January 1929. The anonymous editors implored adherents to purchase "as many copies as possible" at ten Pfennige each, and to distribute them to "ideological comrades" (Cesinnungsgenossen) and to "honest persons who still stand o~tside."~' Each issue contained one or two feature articles dealing in some depth with issues of culture and ideology. Several shorter pieces documented artistic and cultural developments around Germany from the Kampfbund's ideological perspective, often focusing on prominent exponents of modernism and socially critical art, such as Max Reinhardt. These articles were supplemented by previews or summaries of Kampjund-sponsored functions, and status reports on the growth and activities of various chapters around Germany.
In February 1929 the Kampfbund initiated its series of public lectures. These functions, which were relatively inexpensive and easy to organize, became the most common form of Kampfbund-sponsored activity. Othmar Spann, a member of the Kampfbund Board of Directors, presented the inaugural lecture. An economist best known for his espousal of the organic, corporatist state, Spann had already won substantial popularity among Weimar conservatives. His lecture, entitled "The Cultural Crisis of the Present," called for the elimination of liberalism and democracy, and their replacement by a system of authoritarian leadership supported by popular will. The lecture was a success inasmuch as it attracted a large audience to the main auditorium at the University of Munich and stimulated attention in the press." A short time later, musicologist Alfred Heuss lectured at the university in Munich under Kampfbund auspices. Highly regarded for his research on Handel and Bach, Heuss was the editor of the prestigious Zeitschrij fur Musik. Heuss's Kampfbund lecture dealt with "The Crisis of German Music," bemoaning the "formal materialism" that had come to domi- nate German music at the expense of "metaphysical deepening."23 After these appearances, neither Spann nor Heuss figured prominently in Kampfbund programming. The spotlight shifted in large part to Rosenberg himself, signaling a shift toward a more pronounced National Socialist dominance of the organization. In April 1929, Rosenberg placed himself on the program for the first time. His lecture was an attack on the trend toward greater sensuality in art, which he saw as one arm in a pincers movement closing in on German culture. Rosenberg ominously described how African primitivism crept into central Europe from the south, promoted by "niggerized Americanism" and French "power politics." Meanwhile, the second pincer, formed by "Mongolian waves of bolshevism," besieged Germany from the east, threatening the "extermination of all German cultural values." Unless stopped, these forces would transform Germany into a formless "swamp culture" (Sumpfkultur).'"hese dire portents reflected the volkisch right wing's preoccupation with the impulsiveness and sensuality of trends like jazz, and with the role played by Germany's internal and external enemies in the popularization of such movements. Kampfbund propaganda would seize on this theme repeatedly. A golden opportunity to emphasize the conspiratorial nature of the threat presented itself in the spring of 1930, when Paul Robeson (a black) was scheduled to perform in Berlin under the auspices of Max Reinhardt (a Jew). 25 If Kampfbund adherents could take solace from the the scarcity of blacks in German society, elemental fears of emancipated women could not be so easily repressed. In the autumn of 1929, the Kampfbund launched its first of many attacks on female emancipation. It took the form of a newsletter article titled "Dollarism and Feminism," by one E. Klein-Wintermann of Leipzig. The article combined its indictment of emancipation with an attack on another favorite target, the mammonist culture of modern capitalism. The growing materialism and lasciviousness of contemporary society, the author reasoned, stemmed from the unleashing of feminine instincts hitherto kept under control by civilized people. These included a lust for pleasure, the "gratification of all imaginable vanities," and "indulgence of every possible sensual and sensory titillation up to the most refined sadism." Klein-Wintermann saw the descent into an "animalistic life of instinct" as "the quintessence of a specifically feminine-determined civilization process." As the article's title suggested, this particular form of degeneration was especially acute in the United States. Echoing a widely accepted stereotype of A m e r i~a ,~~ Klein-Wintermann depicted an uncultured society, a "dollar paradise" obsessed with technology (e.g. "senseless automobile driving") and an unbridled materialism. At the heart of this allegedly degenerate system stood "the American female," whose licentiousness and "unparalleled extravagance" had reduced her male companion (the "Yankee") to a "work and love slave," a "trained poodle," an "industriously rotating dollar generator," whose main purpose in life had become the satiation of his mate's acquisitiveness and lust for physical pleasure. To Klein-Wintermann, therefore, America presented a worstcase scenario for unrestrained capitalism's ability to debase the soul, and to emasculate the male. "Americanization" would inevitably produce the same result in Germany.27
While lectures, literary readings, and music recitals accounted for the majority of Kampfbund programs between 1929 and 1931, some local chapters seized the initiative to undertake more ambitious projects. The Bonn chapter organized an "Exhibition of the Good German Book," in December 1929. The Bonn Kampfbund arranged for special displays of nationalistic books to be set up in local bookstores, which could in turn integrate the displays into pre-Christmas pr~motions.~' In early 1930, the Diisseldorf chapter attempted to persuade the city monuments commission to erect a memorial to Albert Leo Schlageter, the German nationalist martyr who, in 1923, had been executed by French occupation authorities in the Rhineland. Conceived essentially on the model of the Bildungsburgertum, the Kampfbund did not attract members in numbers comparable to those of mass organizations or political parties. From April 1929 to January 1932, membership climbed from 300 to around 2,100.32 During this period the Mitteilungen published the names and, in most cases, occupations of 527 new members (i.e., about 25 percent of all members) who had agreed publicly to acknowledge their connection with the Kampfbund. The Appendix presents a sociographic analysis of this data, from which several significant patterns emerge. The Kampfbund, not surprisingly, overwhelmingly attracted elite segments of the German bourgeoisie. The university milieu produced 17.1 percent of the sample, with professors forming the largest single subgroup, representing 12.5 percent of the entire sample. Academic professionals from fields such as the law, medicine, and education constituted an additional 19 percent of the sample. Artists and intellectuals, including writers, editors, performing artists, visual artists, and architects, made up 15.1 percent of the member sample. Entrepreneurs, including several publishers and manufacturers, together with high-level business managers, such as syndics and executive directors (Gescha$s&hrer), combined to form 5.9 percent of the sample. A bit higher, at 6.1 percent, was the representation of middle and high-level civil servants. Nobility with ranks higher than von and socialites represented 4.2 percent of the sample, and other elites (parsons, officials of social-cultural associations) represented 4.5 percent of the sample. Taken together, all of these socially elite groups, which accounted for less than 3 percent of the total German adult p~p u l a t i o n ,~~ constituted 71.9 percent of the Kampfbund sample.
Beyond the Besitz und Bildungsburgertum, the sample reflects the Kampfbund's particular attraction for members of the nobility. Of the sample's twenty-two noblemen and noblewomen with titles above the rank of von, nineteen listed no further o c~u p a t i o n .~~ Among them were three princes (including Wolrad and Friedrich Christian of SchaumburgLippe), one princess, and one archprincess. By late 1929, the Kampfbund could also count among its adherents Walter von Bogen u. Schostedt, the executive director of the German Society of Nobility (Deutsche Adelsgenossenschaft) .
Among lower-middle-class members of the sample, merchants (KaufIeute) and small businessmen were the most prominent, constituting 8.2 percent of the total sample. Low-level white-collar employees formed 5.7 percent of the sample, and low-level civil servants an WElMAR CULTURE AND NATIONAL SOCIALlSM additional 1.5 percent. Only two of the listed members, a machine builder and a railroad assistant, could be classified as skilled manual workers. Taken together, these petit-bourgeois groups (adding in widows and pensioners) composed only 18.6 percent of the Kampfbund sample. By comparison, these social categories formed the collective backbone of the NSDAP, accounting for well over 50 percent of all card-carrying party members.
Women constituted 15.7 percent of the Kampfbund sample, suggesting a level of female representation in the Kampfbund roughly double that encountered in the NSDAP, which discouraged female m e m b e r~h i p .~~ It was, perhaps, precisely the pronounced antifeminism noted earlier that attracted tradition-minded women to the Kampfbund. For thirty-one of the eighty-three women in the sample, no occupation was listed, indicating a strong probability that many fulfilled traditional gender roles as wives and mothers. The sample includes four noblewomen and three socialites. Several women in the sample were listed as representatives of conservative and traditional organizations such as the Richard Wagner Association of German Women (Richard-Wagner-Verband deutscher Frauen), the League of German Girl Scouts (Bund deutscher Pfadjnderinnen), and the Association for German Women's Culture (Verband fur Deutsche Frauenkultur). In addition to five women who listed themselves as "widows," there were many who identified themselves as spouses (e.g., Geh. Ratsgattin). Although these characteristics of the female membership further underscore the Kampfbund's traditionalist attraction, one should not overlook the presence of significant numbers of females in the professional, artistic, and intellectual subgroups.36 Moreover, several women performed important functions for the organization. Winifried Wagner and Eva Chamberlain gave the Kampfbund their blessing, and allowed their names to be associated with it publicly. Elsa Bruckmann, wife of the conservative publisher Hugo Bruckmann, was a member of the first Board of Directors. Other women were engaged as performers at Kampfbund-sponsored events, particularly in Munich. In November 1929, Countess Edlth Salburg read from her writings about "old Austrian reminiscences" at a "social evening" held at the Munich Men's Club ballads during an evening of "rich artistic enjoyment." In May 1930, Juga Krannhals-Russel, wife of Paul Krannhals, a leading theorist of the authoritarian "organic state," read from her poems.37
Aside from considerations of class and gender, the Kampfbund lists also reflect the geographical distribution of members before 1932, suggesting a pattern of highly localized organizational success. As with most grassroots organizations, much depended on the ability and determination of activists on the scene. Of the sample's 527 names, sixty-seven listed Munich as the city of residence. The other larger chapters were Dresden, with forty-six names in the sample; BonntBad Godesberg, with fortyfour; Dusseldorf, with thirty-two, and Berlin, with thirty. Heidelberg, like Bonn an old university town, was home to twenty-eight of those appearing on the lists, while Jena, site of another university, had thirteen names in the sample. On the other hand, only a single member was listed for Tubingen, the site of a venerable university, while none were listed for the university towns of Marburg and Gottingen. In Bavaria, outside of the cultural center of Munich, the Kampfbund established a significant presence only in Nuremberg (including Erlangen), home to nine members on the lists, and, oddly, the small city of Nordlingen, whose six acknowledged Kampfbund members included the mayor. This pattern of isolated successes held true for northern Germany as well. For example the lists showed no members in Bremen, and only four each in Hanover and Hamburg. Yet the obscure community of Quakenbruck placed four residents on the membership lists, while the nearby cities of Oldenburg and Osnabruck had only one acknowledged member between them.
The lists reveal still another important dimension to the Kampfbund's growth between 1928 and 1931. One finds numerous examples of groupjoining by persons drawn from common social or occupational environments. In early 1930, seven Heidelberg university students joined at around the same time, as did two teachers from Weissenfels. In the spring of 1930, four merchants joined in Dusseldorf, as did two widows in Karlsruhe, two junior lawyers (Referendare) in Oppeln, and two retired civil servants in Pocking (near Munich). These patterns suggest that word-of-mouth and small-scale, informal organizing among personal acquaintances did assist in the Kampfbund's growth, much as the founders had intended.38 At the end of 1929, the Board of Directors expressed satisfaction that Kampfbund members had hosted numerous "functions in 38. This conclusion supports the findings of Koshar, Social Life, on the social roots of National Socialism in Marburg. There is no record of pre-1933 Kampfbund activity in that university town.
intimate circles" to supplement the more visible public programs. 39 O n only one occasion prior to 1933 did the Kampfbund enjoy an opportunity to exercise direct political power. When National Socialist Wilhelm Frick became Minister of the Interior and Culture in a rightwing coalition in Thuringia between January 1930 and April 1931, he appointed Hans Severus Ziegler, leader of the Thuringian Kampfbund, to the post of "Culture, Art, and Theater Specialist." Ziegler used his position to coordinate a purge of modern art from museums and public buildings under his jurisdiction. Noting the need to protect "moral forces" against "alien racial influences" and the "glorification of Negroism," Frick proclaimed restrictions on performances of "jazz band and percussion music, Negro dances, [and] Negro songs." The Kampfbund newsletter, while carefully avoiding mention of Frick's connection with the NSDAP, warmly praised the measures in Thuringia, noting that "for the first time since 1918, something official is being undertaken against racial and spiritual decomposition. '''O Frick and Ziegler also brought in Paul Schultze-Naumburg to head the State Academy of Art in Weimar. An original member of the Kampfbund's Board of Directors, Schultze-Naumburg had gradually emerged as the Kampfbund's leading public spokesman after Rosenberg. SchultzeNaumburg is known primarily for his notorious book Kunst und Rasse (Art and Race), published in 1928, in which he argued that the images depicted in abstract or expressionist painting were accurate manifestations of the artists' own state of racial decay. The patent absurdity of this theory should not be permitted to obscure the fact that SchultzeNaumburg had once been counted among Germany's most respected architect^.^' As a proponent of a kind of progressive historicism in the latter years of the German Empire and the early years of the Weimar Republic, Schultze-Naumburg had sought to synthesize the geometric simplicity of the emerging modern style with essential characteristics of traditional German home design. But the audacity and quick pace of architectural experimentation in the 1920s transformed SchultzeNaumburg into one of the leading critics of modern a r~h i t e c t u r e .~~ A figure of Schultze-Naumburg's stature undoubtedly helped pave the Kampfbund's way to legitimacy in many circles.
With Kampfbund activists at least temporarily inhabiting positions of power in Thuringia, the organization chose Weimar, the province's capital, as the site for a threeday youth festival in June 1930. Conspicuous on the list of the twenty-eight participating youth organizations were the National Socialist Student League (NS-Studentenbund), the Hitler Youth, and several other groups connected to the Nazi party. Other participants included the Wandervogel, the League of German Girl Scouts, and the National Association of German Ofticers (Nationalverband deutscher Ofiziere). Determined to "combat all manifestations destructive to race and nation," the assembled youth marched through the streets, participated in "strenuous" sporting events, and heard numerous nationalistic speeches.43 If the events in Thuringia had contributed to the merging of the Kampfbund's public identity with that of the NSDAP, developments in the Kampfbund's Berlin chapter erased all remaining distinctions. Hans Hinkel, a professional Nazi activist and propagandist from the earliest days of the movement, founded the Berlin chapter in 1930. In 1932, Hinkel, known for his impetuousness and ambition, struck a deal with Joseph Goebbels, the Gauleiter of Berlin, according to which the Kampfbund would serve as the party's "major bearer of the struggle for German culture" in Berlin. Goebbels ordered all NSDAP members in his Gau who were artists and "culture creators" to join the Kam~fbund.~~ It was, however, still possible to be a Kampfbund member without joining the party; the Kampfbund thus retained its function as a back door into the Nazi movement for reluctant Germans. As an NSDAP document from September 1932 explained, the Kampfbund "struggles for the promotion of German culture as defined by Adolf Hitler, however it does not restrict its work to members of the Nazi party." The Kampfbund could therefore "appeal to persons active in German cultural life who decline a formal connection with the party." The Kampfbund would "agitate and assemble" culturally active Germans, drawing them into a circle that would, ideally, "prepare them for entry into the Nazi party," or, at least, into an "atmosphere" imbued with the "principles of the National Socialist movement. " 45 In 1932 the Berlin Kampfbund also intensified its propaganda and programs aimed specifically at professional artists, seeking to transform the chapter into a shadow professional association (Berufsverband) modelled on other NSDAP professional auxiliarie~.~~ In the politically rarified In addition to raising the Kampfbund's profile to artists such as Thiele, Hinkel's maneuvers in Berlin had several further important consequences. They made Hinkel a prominent party figure on the Berlin cultural scene, positioning him strategically for powerful appointments after the seizure of power; they gave Gauleiter Goebbels a major voice in the affairs of an organization that was nominally under the leadership of his competitor Alfred Rosenberg; they transferred the center of Karnpfbund activity from Munich to Berlin; and they significantly increased the size of the Kampfbund's membership. During 1932, total Kampfbund membership for the entire Reich rose from 2,100 to around 6,000.48 Although a good portion of this increase must be attributed to the overall growth of the Nazi movement's popularity, one must surmise that the Hinkel-Goebbels arrangement in Berlin played a major role as well.
Under Hinkel's leadership, the Berlin chapter attracted the participation of several prestigious figures from the local cultural scene. In the field of music, among the most active was Professor Doctor h.c. Gustav Havemann. A violinist, Havemann had become concertmaster of the Lubeck orchestra in 1901 at the age of 19. At age 27 he took over the concertmaster's seat in Hamburg, and at age 33, in 1915, he moved on to the same position at the State Opera in Dresden, one of Germany's finest and most prestigious cultural institutions. In 1920, Havemann was appointed Professor of Violin at the Academy of Music in Berlin, arguably the pinnacle of music pedagogy. Like Schultze-Naumburg, Havemann had come of age in an earlier era, and had experienced the shock of the new with the coming of the Republic. Precisely when he turned to the Kampfbund is not known. By the end of 1932 he had joined the directorate of the Music Section of the Kampfbund, had become director 
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were instrumental in the political "coordination" of professional associations and labor unions in the cultural sector; Gustav Havemann, for example, seized control of Germany's largest musicians' union, the German Musician's Association (Deutscher Musiker V e r b~n d ) .~~ Throughout Germany, artists rushed to join the Kampfbund. Between January and October, membership rose from 6,000 to 38,000.63 Most of the new members joined for opportunistic reasons, figuring that membership would increase job security or improve future prospects, although quite a few probably felt genuinely grateful for the opportunity to join a movement with which they had quietly sympathized in the past.
The rapid growth of the Kampfbund in 1933, both in size and in influence, proved deceptive. The Kampfbund had served as a useful tool during the rise to power and the phase of political "coordination." By the beginning of 1934, however, the new Reich Ministry of Propaganda, together with the ministry-supervised Reich Chamber of Culture (Reichskulturkammer), both under the leadership of Joseph Goebbels, had outmaneuvered Rosenberg in the quest to institutionalize Nazi control of the arts. As the compulsory professional organization for culture, the Chamber of Culture embodied many of the very corporatist reform concepts that the Kampfbund had advocated. Ironically, compulsory membership for artists in the Chamber of Culture undermined the Kampfbund's base of support. Artists no longer perceived an urgent need to join the Kampfbund, as they had during the confused months of 1933. The decline of the Kampfbund also resulted from Hitler's lack of faith in Rosenberg's capacity to administer a large organization, as well as the Fuhrer's confidence in the ability of Goebbels to reconcile the German culture establishment to Nazi rule. The Kampfbund suffered a severe diminution in influence and status, and from 1934 on, under a new name, the National Socialist Culture Community (Nationalsozialistische Kulturgemeinde) exercised only minor influence in German cultural affairs. Removed from the center of power, Rosenberg's new organization quickly emerged as a hard-line critic of Goebbels's Chamber of Culture, accusing him of coddling modernists and of moving too slowly on the purge of Jews from German artistic life. 64 Despite its rapid decline, the Kampfbund had left an important legacy. It had helped set much of the cultural agenda for the Third Reich, aggressively promoting corporatism, anti-Semitism, and a hybrid of
